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Abstract  
 
 
 
 
 
Excess entry  – or the high failure rate  of market-entry decisions –  is  often  attributed to 
overconfidence exhibited by entrepreneurs.  We show analytically that whereas excess entry 
is an inevitable consequence of imperfect assessments of entrepreneurial skill, it does not 
imply overconfidence. Judgmental fallibility leads to excess entry even when everyone is 
underconfident.  Self-selection  implies  greater  confidence  (but  not  necessarily 
overconfidence) among those who start new businesses than those who do not and among 
successful  entrants  than  failures.  Our  results  question  claims  that  “entrepreneurs  are 
overconfident” and emphasize the need to understand the role of judgmental fallibility in 
producing economic outcomes.  
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I. Introduction 
  The  phenomenon  of  excess  entry  refers  to  the  observation  that  “too  many” 
entrepreneurs elect to enter certain industries and that many subsequently fail. In the U.S., for 
example, Small Business Administration datasets suggest that, in any year, 10%-12% of all 
firms are new entrants (Dennis 1997). In Europe, Geroski (1995) documented that up to 100 
new firms enter each of the 87 classifications of British manufacturing industries annually.  
Individuals as well as firms create many new enterprises. However, it has been estimated that 
75% of new businesses do not survive more than five years (Bernardo and Welch 1997). 
Investigating the difference between closure and failure, Headd (2003) reports that roughly 
50% of firms exit within their first four years, and about two-thirds of these are unsuccessful 
at closure (as defined by their owners). This implies an overall failure rate of 33%. 
The  causes  of  this  phenomenon  have  been  attributed  to  both  economic  and 
psychological factors. As to the former, it has been argued that entrepreneurs essentially face 
lotteries with highly skewed payoffs. Thus, whereas probabilities of success are low, the 
accompanying  payoffs  are  high.  It  is  rational  for  entrepreneurs  to  accept  gambles  with 
positive expected utility even though only a minority can succeed.  
The  psychological  explanation  has  focused  on  the  notion  of  overconfidence.  For 
example,  Cooper,  Woo,  and  Dunkelberg  (1988)  found  that  81%  of  a  sample  of  2,994 
entrepreneurs believed that their chances of success were at least 70%, and one-third believed 
they were certain to succeed.  When asked about others, however, only 39% believed that the 
chances of any business like theirs succeeding were 70% or more.  Another recent survey 
(Koellinger, Minatti, and Schade 2007) documents a negative relation between self-reported 
levels of entrepreneurial confidence and the survival chances of new entrepreneurs across 
countries. In addition to surveys, the psychological evidence favoring overconfidence is also 
grounded in controlled experiments (Camerer and Lovallo 1999; Moore and Cain 2007).     
If overconfidence leads to excess entry, much could be gained if entrepreneurs learned 
to  modify  their beliefs. Indeed, this  is the implicit  recommendation  of  the  psychological 
evidence just cited. However, if entrepreneurs are not really overconfident, this advice could 
be counter-productive.  In this paper, we do not question that the judgments of entrepreneurs 
are  imperfect  or  fallible.  However,  fallibility  does  not  necessarily  imply  overconfidence.  
Indeed, equating the two can lead to erroneous implications.  
To motivate our  argument, imagine a situation where  entrepreneurs are considering 
entering a market where success can only be achieved by those whose skill level, Y, is above 
a specific threshold, yc. Imagine further that each entrepreneur makes a judgment or receives   4 
a signal, X, about his/her skill level that is imperfectly correlated with Y. However, there is no 
systematic bias, that is E[Y] = E[X]. In this case, some entrepreneurs will believe that their 
skill level lies above yc when, in fact, it does not, and their decision to enter the market will 
lead to excess entry. At the same time, others will believe that their skill level lies below yc 
when, in fact, it is greater. But, if the latter take no action (i.e., they decide to stay out), no 
associated  outcomes  can  be  observed.  In  other  words,  when  entrepreneurs  rely  on  the 
imperfect  relation  between  assessed  and  true  skill  to  take  action,  we  are  guaranteed  to 
observe excess entry but not its converse, missed opportunities.    
It  is  important  to  note  that  this  scenario  also  captures  the  essence  of  many  other 
situations where individuals accept risk by betting on their skills. Consider, for example, 
career decisions, selecting research projects, strategic industrial choices, and so on. These 
examples also typically involve ambiguity in that probabilities of outcomes are neither known 
nor easily quantified.         
In this paper, we first review previous explanations of excess entry and related literature 
and note that overconfidence can be considered in both absolute and relative terms. Next, we 
specify the model sketched above in greater detail and also show how the differential validity 
of signals indicating skill levels should affect entry decisions but that this depends on market 
capacity. We go on to illustrate our model’s implications through simulations. In short, when 
signal validity is imperfect, excess entry can occur without systematic overconfidence in a 
population  of  potential  market  entrants.  At  the  same  time,  there  are  also  many  missed 
opportunities.  Moreover, different levels of overconfidence (absolute and relative) will be 
observed between sub-populations that enter and do not enter the market as well as among 
successful  and  unsuccessful  entrants.  Whereas  the  latter  are  inevitably  shown  to  be 
overconfident,  many  of  the  former  are  too.  The  interpretation  of  empirical  studies  of 
entrepreneurial overconfidence is thus fraught with difficulties. We conclude by emphasizing 
distinctions between different types of overconfidence, the need to understand the role of 
judgmental fallibility in producing economic outcomes, and implications for the training of 
future entrepreneurs.   
 
II. Previous explanations and related literature 
  Explanations of the excess entry phenomenon have been grounded in both economics 
and psychology.  The standard economic story is that high profits attract entry and entrants 
bid away these profits, eventually pushing the industry into long run equilibrium with no 
excess returns and a given number of firms. Similarly, whenever profits fall below “normal”   5 
levels, exit occurs and this depopulation of the industry raises profitability for the survivors 
back to equilibrium. From this perspective, failures are “hit and run” entrants that have only a 
small chance of success in the limited period when the industry exhibits extra profits.   
Alternatively,  starting  a  business  can  be  framed  as  facing  a  gamble  where  the 
probability of winning is extremely low but the payoff for success is large. This explanation 
enlarges the former perspective by accounting for uncertainty, information, and risk attitudes 
in determining entry decisions.    
A further hypothesis is that entrepreneurs are more risk seeking than non-entrepreneurs.  
However, the empirical literature provides conflicting results.  The general conclusion is that 
entrepreneurs do not differ in risk attitudes from the overall population (Brockhaus 1980; 
Masters and Meier 1988; Palich and Bagby 1995) and may even be more risk averse than 
non-entrepreneurs (Miner and Raju 2004).
1 Alternatively, entrepreneurs may simply accept 
risky business situations as given (Sarasvathy, Simon, and Lave 1998) or assess opportunities 
and threats differently from non-entrepreneurs (Norton and Moore 2002).    
Psychological explanations for excess entry are based on the notion of overconfidence 
(Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982; Klayman, Soll, Gonzalez-Vallejo, and Barlas 1999). 
Specifically,  individuals  overestimate  their  chances  of  success  and  erroneously  expect  to 
succeed where others will fail. Thus, the decision to enter may be taken even if negative 
industry profits are expected. 
Recently,  Moore  and  Healy  (2008)  clarified  conceptual  confusion  surrounding  the 
concept of overconfidence by distinguishing three distinct meanings. First, people can be 
overconfident  in  estimating  their  ability  to  do  something.  For  example,  a  person  might 
overestimate his ability to run a Marathon within a certain time.  Moore and Healy call this 
overestimation and it is important to note that it is not universal. A robust finding is that 
people tend to overestimate their own skill on hard tasks but underestimate it on easy tasks 
(Burson,  Larrick,  and  Klayman  2006;  Moore  and  Cain  2007).    One  explanation  is  that 
because judgments of skill typically involve error, they are liable to be regressive (Dawes and 
Mulford 1996; Erev, Wallsten, and Budescu 1994).   
Second,  a  person  might  express  overconfidence  in  ability  relative  to  others;  for 
example,  the  belief  that  one  can  run  the  Marathon  faster  than,  say,  80%  of  a  specific 
population.  Moore and Healy call this overplacement.  It is also known as the “better-than-
average” effect whereby people judge their abilities in familiar domains, such as driving, as   6 
being superior to that of the “average” person (Svenson 1981). At the same time, however, 
there is a tendency to judge oneself as below average in unfamiliar (and therefore hard) tasks 
such as juggling (Kruger 1999). Also, as Hoelzl and Rustichini (2005) demonstrate, this type 
of overconfidence may be moderated when people are required to make incentive-compatible 
choices as opposed to expressing opinions.  
Third, people can be overconfident when estimating future uncertainty; for example, 
when providing confidence intervals for forecasts of, say, sales that subsequently turn out to 
be too narrow (see, e.g., Alpert and Raiffa 1982). Moore and Healy call this overprecision. 
Interestingly,  Wu  and  Knott  (2006)  suggest  that,  whereas  entrepreneurs  might  not  be 
overconfident  in  assessing  market  demand,  they  do  overestimate  their  ability  to  manage 
ventures successfully.      
Camerer and Lovallo (1999) tested the overconfidence hypothesis experimentally in a 
game designed to mimic entry decisions.  Specifically, N participants decide simultaneously 
to enter a market with a pre-announced capacity of c participants (N > c) where payoffs 
depend on participants’ ranks (i.e., of those choosing to enter, the highest-ranked participant 
receives the largest payoff, the lowest-ranked participant, the smallest payoff).  Ranks were 
established in two ways at the end of the experiment (i.e., after all choices had been made):  
at random, and on the basis of relative performance on a test (skill).  When making entry 
decisions, however, participants knew how ranks would be established, i.e., at random or 
according to relative skill.  Camerer and Lovallo tested for overconfidence by comparing 
entry rates between the random and skill conditions and found significant effects – greater 
entry under the skill condition.    
Camerer and Lovallo claim that their results are consistent with overconfidence in that, 
whereas participants had accurate expectations concerning the number of competitors, the 
differential  entry  rates  between  the  skill  and  random  conditions  provided  evidence  of 
overconfidence in their relative skill.
2   As we demonstrate below, however, the decision to 
act on the basis of an imperfect signal, but not to act in the absence of a signal, does not 
necessarily imply overconfidence, either in the sense of overestimation or overplacement.       
 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
1 Parenthetically, this literature relies on biased samples in that studies only include “successful” survivors, i.e., 
those unsuccessful entrepreneurs who have left the market are excluded. 
2 Camerer and Lovallo also asked their participants to estimate the number of entrants on each round.  For most 
participants, forecasts were unbiased. 
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III. A model of entrepreneurial entry 
  To illustrate how the validity of signals indicating skill levels affects entry decisions, 
we  present  a  simple  model  of  entry  behavior.    We  then  use  the  model  to  quantify  the 
observed level of overconfidence (both in terms of overestimation and overplacement) among 
entrepreneurs who decide to enter the market and among those who stay out. We emphasize 
the differences between those who enter and succeed and those who fail on entry. The model 
also provides insights on missed opportunities and how these could be reduced.  Of course, 
there are more detailed formal models of the evolution of industry (e.g., Jovanovich 1982; 
Klepper 1996). However, our purpose is to illustrate the effect of judgmental fallibility and 
confidence on entry. The model presented here serves this purpose well.  
We  assume  that  an  entrepreneur’s  success  in  entering  a  market  depends  on  her 
managerial skill, Y.  However, this is not known precisely by the entrepreneur and has to be 
estimated. Denote the estimate by X.  On any given occasion, therefore, the entrepreneur is 
overconfident in her skill (in the sense of overestimation) if x > y and underconfident if x < 
y.
3  However, assume that, on average, the population of entrepreneurs is neither over- nor 
underconfident, i.e., E[Y] = E[X], and that the imperfect relation between Y and X can be 
captured by the correlation between them, xy r , that we label signal validity.  For simplicity, 
we assume that X and Y are standardized normal variables, N(0,1).  
Within this set-up, we define overplacement as occasions when y < E[Y] and x > E[Y].   
That is, the entrepreneur is overconfident in the sense of overplacement if her true skill y is 
inferior to the average skill in the population and her estimate of own skill x surpasses the 
average skill.  The proportion of overplacement, i.e., entrepreneurs who erroneously consider 
themselves  to  be  “better-than-average”,  is  defined  by  the  joint  probability 
[ ] [ ] { } Y E x Y E y P > Ç <  and is a decreasing function of signal validity, xy r .
4 This definition 
captures the notion of “better-than-average.” However, overplacement can also be defined 
relative to any fractile of the distribution of Y and not just the median.  
Suppose further that success or failure depends on whether the level of skill exceeds a 
threshold, or success cut-off point, yc, located at a specific fractile of the distribution of Y.  
This threshold captures market capacity: larger values of yc correspond to more stringent 
                                                
3 We use upper case letters to denote random variables, e.g., Y, and lower case letters to designate specific 
values, e.g., y. As exceptions to this practice, we use lower case Greek letters to denote random error variables, 
e.g., e, as well as parameters, e.g., r.
  
4 To aid intuition in understanding the importance of signal validity, rxy, in overplacement, note that if X and Y 
were identical then, by our definition, overplacement would be impossible.  
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markets where capacity (and therefore the rate of success) is smaller. Overplacement relative 
to the success cut-off point, yc, is defined by the joint probability { } c c y x y y P > Ç < . 
When does market entry take place? What probability of success does an individual 
entrepreneur require to enter a market?  This question can be reframed by asking what level 
of estimated skill, xc, would leave an entrepreneur indifferent between entering or staying out 
of the market.     
Assume that if the entrepreneur enters the market and loses (i.e., if  c y y < ), a loss of K, 
the  initial  investment,  is  incurred.  On  the  other  hand,  if  successful  (i.e., c y y > ),  the 
entrepreneur’s payoff is K y y f c - - ) ( , that is a function of the extent to which y exceeds  c y  
less the investment, K.
5  We assume that the payoff of the decision to stay out is equal to 
zero. Thus, entrepreneur i is indifferent between entering and not entering the market if her 
expected payoff of entry is equal to zero: 
[ ] ( ) 0 ) ( ) ( = - - + - = = E ∫ ∫
¥
¥ - c
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y
i X Y c
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i X Y i dy x y f K y y dy x y f K x X entry ,        (1)        
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The solution of equation (1) determines c i x x =
* , i.e., the entry decision cut-off point.  
Thus, if c i x x > , the decision is to enter the market; and if  c i x x < , to stay out (all other things 
being equal). The probability of entry thus increases when  c x  decreases and the location of xc 
can  vary  depending  on  both  risk  attitudes  and  the  expected  economic  consequences  of 
different situations.  For the purpose of this paper, however, we assume risk neutrality.  
Because closed-form solutions cannot be found for equation (1), we have simulated 
three scenarios (see also the Appendix). These differ on the cost of entry, K, with K = 0.1, 
0.4, and 1.0, and results are depicted in the three panels of Figure I. Within each scenario, we 
vary  both  signal  validity,  xy r   and  the  success  cut-off  point, c y .  The  curves  depict  the 
probability of entry as a function of xy r . One curve corresponds to each level of c y . 
 
                                                
5 For simplicity we assume that f(y - yc) = (y - yc). Monotonic changes in the form of this function will not alter 
the qualitative implications of the model. 
 
   9 
------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure I about here 
------------------------------------------------- 
Qualitatively, the graphs show that signal validity determines the number of entrants 
and that this, in turn, depends on market capacity. In particular, it is important to distinguish 
between cases where market capacity is small (operationalized in our model by high values of 
the success cut-off point,  c y ), as opposed to large (low  c y ). For the former (consider, e.g., 
the restaurant business in a small provincial town), the number of market entrants increases 
as signal validity increases – i.e., in tough markets, entrepreneurs need a more valid signal to 
enter the market. For the latter (consider, e.g., the restaurant business in a large tourist city), 
the  number  of  entrants  decreases  as  signal  validity  increases.    However,  when  K,  the 
investment needed to enter is high, an increase in signal validity triggers more entry even in 
relatively large markets (i.e., relatively low values of  c y ; compare the curves corresponding 
to  the  same  c y ’s  in  the  left,  central  and  right  hand-side  panels  of  Figure  I).  Further 
interpretation of Figure I is provided in the Appendix.  
It is also useful to think about signal validity as a proxy for “skill uncertainty” (i.e., 
uncertainty about one’s skill) that may be due to technological or market changes in the 
industry or even lack of experience on the part of the entrepreneur. One implication of our 
model is that, when cost of entry is low, diminishing uncertainty increases the rate of entry in 
the toughest (i.e., stringent) markets but decreases it in larger markets.  When cost of entry is 
relatively high, however, lower uncertainty implies more entry in all but the largest markets.  
As  another  implication,  consider  the  experimental  set-up  of  Camerer  and  Lovallo 
(1999) that involved a known, small market capacity, no cost of entry but high cost of failure. 
In this situation, more entrepreneurs should enter the market as signal validity increases.  
Thus – contrary to the assertion of Camerer and Lovallo – the observation of a higher entry 
rate being associated with an imperfectly valid as opposed to no signal (i.e., between the skill 
and random conditions), does not necessarily imply overconfidence.        
  Model simulations.  As a general statement, our model predicts the observation of 
excess entry even if there is no overconfidence in the population of potential entrepreneurs 
(in the sense of estimation), i.e.,  [ ] Y E  = [ ] X E , provided signal validity is imperfect, i.e.,  xy r < 
1. We now show why it happens and then further investigate the model to refine the above 
statement and to illuminate more specific points.  In doing so, we treat xc  as endogenous (i.e., 
determined by equation (1)).  
       10 
First, we examine how different values of signal validity or skill uncertainty,  xy r  affect 
rates of market entry and excess entry – that is,  { } c x x P >  and { } c c x x y y P > < . 
Second, whereas much has been said about excess entry, less attention has been paid to 
missed opportunities, that is, businesses that would have been successful had entrepreneurs 
decided to enter the market instead of staying out of it (Moore, Oesch, and Zietsma 2007). 
How important are these (i.e., { } c c x x y y P < > )? 
 Third,  we  assess  the  observed  levels  of  overconfidence  in  the  senses  of  both 
overestimation  and  overplacement.  In  particular,  what  proportion  of  entrepreneurs 
overestimates  their  absolute  skills  (i.e.,  for  whom  x  >  y)?  What  proportion  overplaces 
themselves relative to others (i.e., for whom y < E[Y] and x > E[Y])? Does confidence differ 
between those who do and do not enter the market, and between successful and unsuccessful 
entrants? On average, do entrepreneurs in different categories such as entrants, non-entrants, 
successful entrants, excess entrants and failures overestimate or underestimate their skills?  
To  answer this  latter  question, we evaluate, separately for  each category, the differences 
between average estimated and true skills, i.e., ( y x - ). 
Finally,  we  ask  what  happens  when  entrepreneurs  are,  on  average,  over-  and 
underconfident. For example, does excess entry occur even in the presence of systematic 
underconfidence among potential entrepreneurs (i.e., when E[X] < E[Y])? 
To investigate these issues, we simulated populations  of 100 entrepreneurs drawing 
estimates of own skill (X) and values of true skill (Y) from correlated normal distributions 
with  fixed  parameters.  For  each  population,  we  calculated  entry  rate,  excess  entry  rate,   
missed  opportunities,  the  proportions  of  overestimation  within  different  categories  (i.e., 
entrants,  non-entrants,  successful  entrants,  and  excess  entrants),  the  proportions  of 
overplacement within the same categories, and the proportions of overplacement among those 
entrepreneurs who overestimate their skills in absolute terms. In addition, we calculated the 
magnitude of over- or underestimation (i.e., the difference between estimated and true skill) 
within  each  category.  We  repeated  the  simulation  50,000  times  for  each  combination  of 
parameters.  Thus,  the  results  correspond  to  the  average  of  50,000  populations  of 
entrepreneurs.  
-------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table I about here 
--------------------------------------------------   11 
Signal  validity  and excess entry.  Table  I  illustrates  the effect  of changes  in  signal 
validity, xy r , when the population of potential entrepreneurs is well calibrated, i.e., when the 
means  of  estimated  and  true  skill  coincide,  E[X]  =  E[Y].  For  each  combination  of  the 
simulation parameters, the entry cut-off,  c x  is found from the indifference equation (1).  We 
provide results for three hypothetical markets (three panels in Table I) of different capacity, 
ranging from large (left panel, 5 . 0 - = c y , equivalent to the 31
st percentile of the population), 
medium (middle panel, 5 . 0 = c y , equivalent to the 69
th percentile of the population), to small 
(right panel, 0 . 1 = c y , equivalent to the 84
th percentile of the population). In this example, the 
cost of entry, K is 0.1.  
In the largest market, almost all (99.9%) potential entrepreneurs decide to enter the 
market when no valid signal about skill is available, i.e., when  0 = xy r   (Table I, line 1). The 
probability of entry in this market decreases gradually as signal validity increases.  In smaller 
markets, the probability of entry increases as signal validity grows larger. For example, in the 
smallest market (right panel), only 0.1% enter when no valid signal is available, and 6.7% 
enter when signal validity increases to 0.9. Excess entry (the probability of failure given entry 
– line 2) is positive across all the situations that we examine (reflecting the imperfect nature 
of the signal), but decreases as the signal becomes more valid (e.g., from 84.4% to 8.0% in 
our most stringent market, right panel). The implication is that the imperfect relation between 
estimated and actual skill ensures excess entry even at the lowest levels of skill uncertainty, 
i.e., when signal validity,  xy r  is close to one.
   
As for  missed opportunities (line 3), the increase of signal validity  from 0.0 to  0.9 
decreases the proportion of missed opportunities by 51% (69.2 to 34.0) in our largest market 
(left panel) and by 34% (15.9 to 10.4) in our smallest market (right panel). 
Signal validity and overconfidence.  The data on proportions of overconfidence in the 
sense  of  overestimation  (line  4)  reveal  several  trends.  First,  these  proportions  are  much 
greater among entrepreneurs who enter the market than those who stay out. In particular, 
across all situations presented in Table I, more than 50% of entrants overestimate their skill 
while at most  50% of non-entrants  do so.  More confident  individuals self-select  into the 
market.  Second,  overestimation  is  greater  among  failures  (excess  entrants)  than  among 
successful entrants. In fact, all failures are overconfident in the sense of overestimation in our 
most and moderately stringent markets (right and central panels).    12 
At one  level it appears that  excess entry is  due to overconfidence in that a greater 
proportion  of  entrepreneurs  who  fail  are  overconfident  compared  to  those  who  succeed. 
However, it is important to recognize that this observation is entirely consistent with a model 
in which population estimates of entrepreneurial abilities are not systematically biased (i.e., 
overconfident), simply imperfect.   
Do different groups of entrepreneurs, on average, overestimate or underestimate their 
skills?  Line  5  presents  the  average  difference  between  estimated  and  true  skills  ( y x - ) 
within different categories and confirms the trend concerning overestimation. There is self-
selection in that entrants, on average, overestimate their skills (positive or zero values of the 
difference y x - ), whereas non-entrants underestimate their skills (negative values or zero). 
As for excess entrants (failures), they overestimate their skills more than successful entrants.   
In particular, excess entrants’ estimates of own skill are 3.6 standard deviations above their 
true skill in the smallest market when outcomes are close to random occurrences (right panel, 
first column). However, this decreases to 0.9 standard deviations when signal validity, xy r , 
increases to 0.9 (same panel, last column). In both cases, the inflations of self estimates are 
above  those  corresponding  to  successful  entrants:  1.8  and  0.1  standard  deviations, 
respectively.  The  trend  is  similar  in  our  least  and  moderately  stringent  markets  (left  and 
central panels).  
It is illuminating to compare the magnitude of average miscalibration among successful 
entrants in different markets. While this subgroup of entrepreneurs is underconfident in their 
skills in the largest market (left panel, first three columns), they are overconfident in the 
smallest (right panel). Importantly, the magnitude of miscalibration (both in the direction of 
under- and overestimation) decreases among both successful entries and failures when signal 
validity, xy r ,  increases.  Thus,  in  surveys  measuring  absolute  confidence  of  active 
entrepreneurs in stringent markets, the presence of overconfidence is almost guaranteed even 
when there is no bias in the population of potential entrepreneurs.  However, it would be 
misleading  to  extrapolate  this  conclusion  to  less  stringent  markets,  where  successful 
entrepreneurs  may  even  be  underconfident.  In  addition,  observed  overconfidence  will  be 
especially  high  when  measured  in  conditions  of  large  skill  uncertainty,  e.g.,  after  a 
technological or product change.  
The  analysis  of  confidence  in  terms  of  overplacement  (line  6)  leads  to  similar 
qualitative conclusions as the analysis of overestimation presented above. In particular, there 
are proportionally more individuals who erroneously believe that they are better than the   13 
success cut-off fractile among entrants than non-entrants. Most revealing is the comparison of 
overplacement  between  successes  and  failures  (excess  entrants).  In  our  tougher  markets 
(central and right panels), all failures believe that they are better than the success cut-off 
fractile when, in fact, they are not. None of the successful entrants do so in any situation that 
we  consider.  Again,  although  surveys  measuring  relative  overconfidence  of  active 
entrepreneurs in an industry might suggest that overconfidence in the sense of overplacement 
is  driving  entry  and  excess  entry,  the  observations  are  also  consistent  with  just  simple 
judgmental fallibility (and not a systematic bias).  
Finally,  are  the  two  types  of  overconfidence  (overestimation  and  overplacement) 
related?  How often do those who overestimate their skill erroneously believe that they are 
“better-than-average”  or  better  than  the  success  cut-off?  We  report  the  probability  of 
overplacement  given  that  individuals  overestimate  their  skill
  on  line  7  of  Table  I.  
Overestimating own skill naturally increases the chances of overplacing yourself relative to 
your  peers  (compare  lines  6  and  7,  “All  potential  entrants”).  Overall,  the  proportions  of 
overplacement given overestimation are far from being equal to one – both in the population 
of  potential  entrepreneurs  and among  entrants.  This  is  especially  true at  higher  levels  of 
signal validity. To conclude, overestimation does not necessarily imply overplacement and 
the two types of overconfidence should be measured separately.   
 
The  effect  of  systematic  miscalibration  in  the  population.  The  above  simulations 
assumed that there was no systematic bias in skill estimates at the level of the population of 
potential entrepreneurs. Would such bias change the implications of our model? To illustrate, 
we shift the mean of estimated skill, E[X] away from the mean of true skill, E[Y] in the 
simulations. Specifically, we vary the mean of estimated skill from -0.9 (underconfidence in 
the sense of underestimation) to 0.9 (overconfidence in the sense of overestimation).  The 
results for the same three markets (of low, moderate, and high capacity) for a fixed signal 
validity,  xy r  of .5 and the cost of entry, K of 0.1 are presented in Table II. For each set of 
parameters, the entry cut-off, xc, is determined from equation (1).  
-------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table II about here 
-------------------------------------------------- 
We comment on several outcomes. First, as the mean level of confidence increases, 
more entrepreneurs enter the market (line 1). Second, excess entry (the probability of failure 
given  entry)  occurs  even  in  underconfident  populations  and  increases  as  population   14 
overconfidence  increases  (line  2).  In  particular,  when  the  population  presents  the  most 
extreme case of underconfidence that we examine, E[X] – E[Y] = -0.9 (left column within 
each panel), excess entry amounts to 15.3% of entrants in the largest market (left panel) and 
22.4% of entrants in the smallest market (right panel).  
In the largest market, entrants coming from underconfident populations underestimate 
their skill (left panel, line 5, first two columns). In more stringent markets, most entrants 
overestimate their skill even when they come from underconfident, on average, populations 
(central and right panels, lines 4 and 5, first two columns). The implication of this result is 
that drawing general inferences regarding entrepreneurial overconfidence based on surveys of 
entrepreneurs active in only stringent markets may be misleading.  
Interestingly,  the  proportions  of  missed  opportunities  drop  significantly  as  the 
population, on average, becomes more overconfident (line 3). In particular, when average 
miscalibration  changes  from  extreme  underconfidence  to  extreme  overconfidence,  missed 
opportunities decrease by 52% (56.1 to 26.7) in our largest market (left panel) and by 19% 
(15.8 to 12.8) in our smallest market (right panel). One intuitive implication of this result 
might be to advise potential entrepreneurs to boost their confidence in order to reduce missed 
opportunities and thereby increase social welfare. However, this would not be wise.  Greater 
overconfidence implies not only less missed opportunities but also more failures (line 2). 
Reducing judgmental fallibility, however, decreases both missed opportunities and failures 
(Table I).  
Overall, the remarkable feature of Table II is that excess entry can be observed even in 
the presence of systematic underconfidence in the population of potential entrepreneurs and 
even  when  both  successful  entrants  and  failures  are  underconfident.  Enhancing 
entrepreneurial overconfidence decreases missed opportunities but at the cost of increased 
failures. One way to decrease both is to reduce skill uncertainty by mitigating judgmental 
fallibility.  
Summary. In short, the model suggests that, with or without systematic overconfidence, 
excess entry simply follows from people acting on estimates of their skill that are imperfectly 
related to their true skill. Moreover, the amount of observable excess entry is a complex 
function of the different parameters identified in our model, that is, signal validity ( xy r ), the 
entry  decision cut-off  ( c x ), the  market  (success) cut-off  ( c y ), and  overconfidence  in  the 
population (E[X] – E[Y]), if any. Thus, from any empirical study, it is difficult to prove or   15 
disprove that overconfidence drives the excess entry phenomenon. As the above simulations 
show, excess entry can be observed even when all entrants are on average underconfident. 
Our model implies that failures exhibit greater confidence than successful entrants. In 
terms of empirical evidence, Koellinger et al. (2007) do indeed report a negative relation 
between entrepreneurial confidence and survival chances. In the  case  of Wu  and Knott’s 
(2006)  study  of  banking,  evidence  of  overplacement  is  heavily  dependent  on  observing 
failures (see Wu & Knott, 2006, p. 1321).  However, as we have shown, the confidence-
survival relation can be observed  whether  or not  the  population of entrepreneurs  is – on 
average  –  overconfident.  Moreover,  surveys  that  document  apparently  overconfident 
entrepreneurs  (e.g.,  Cooper  et  al.,  1988)  suffer  from  selection  bias  in  that  respondents 
typically exclude people who have decided not to take entrepreneurial actions.  
Our  model  further  suggests  that  overconfidence  among  active  entrepreneurs  will  be 
especially great in conditions of high skill uncertainty, e.g., after technological or product 
changes.  At  the  very  least,  the  model  provides  directions  for  empirical  researchers  to 
investigate what drives excess entry – and when. 
 
IV. Discussion 
We  have  shown  that,  in  the  absence  of  systematic  overconfidence  in  a  population  of 
entrepreneurs and, even in the presence of systematic underconfidence, an imperfect relation 
between estimated and true ability is sufficient to produce observable excess entry.  
Our analytical results are the consequence of two pervasive phenomena. One is the 
presence of irreducible error in judgment and the other the fact that people take actions based 
on fallible judgment. What is surprising is that people don’t recognize the joint effects of the 
two phenomena.  At the individual level, it has been shown that these two factors can induce 
people to have unwarranted confidence in their judgments (Einhorn and Hogarth 1978).  At 
the  same  time,  ignoring  their  impact,  many  studies  assert  that  entrepreneurs  are 
overconfident. Paradoxically, the very factors that some social scientists have identified as 
leading people to be overconfident in their judgments are the same as those that others ignore 
in asserting that entrepreneurs are overconfident. (For related phenomena, see Denrell 2003, 
2005).  
We have shown analytically that judgmental fallibility produces self-selection in that 
entrepreneurs who take risks by acting on beliefs about their own skill are, on average, more 
confident  (but  not  necessarily  overconfident)  than  those  who  take  no  action.  This  result 
echoes  the  empirical  evidence  by  Koellinger  et  al.  (2007)  who  concluded  that   16 
(over)confidence in one’s own entrepreneurial skills largely determines the decision to start a 
new business.  At the same time, we have shown that entry (and excess entry) can occur even 
if the population of entrepreneurs is, on average, underconfident. Moreover, Koellinger et al. 
(2007) (and many other empirical studies) measured entrepreneurial self-confidence and not 
overconfidence and so to conclude that overconfidence is driving entry is imprecise, to say 
the least. As we have shown, those who decide to start a new business always exhibit greater 
confidence than non-entrants, even when both groups are on average underconfident.  Excess 
entry  can  result  simply  from  imperfect  judgment  involving  random  errors  rather  than  a 
systematic bias.   
We  have  also  shown  that  in  some  circumstances  (particularly  stringent  markets), 
entrepreneurs should act on the basis of imperfectly valid signals and thus, in market entry 
experiments of the type conducted by Camerer and Lovallo (1999), it is inappropriate to infer 
overconfidence  from  observing  higher  entry  rates  in  “skill”  as  opposed  to  “random” 
conditions.     
  Our results support the useful distinctions made by Moore and Healy (2008) between 
three different types of overconfidence: overestimation, overplacement, and overprecision.  
Our  analytical  model  shows  that  different  types  of  confidence  do  not  necessarily  occur 
simultaneously. There is growing awareness in the literature of the need to recognize the 
different ways in which people can be overconfident (Wu and Knott 2006; Hilton 2007).  
An  important  issue  centers  on  the  costs  and  benefits  of  overconfidence.  Bonnefon, 
Hilton,  and  Molian  (2006)  provide  an  intriguing  result  that  suggests  a  positive  relation 
between  success  as  an  entrepreneur  and  being  appropriately  calibrated  when  assessing 
uncertainty (i.e., lack of overprecision). In a group of entrepreneurs attending a management 
course, the more successful entrepreneurs exhibited less overconfidence in an experimental 
task.  Biais  and  Weber  (2007)  have  further  demonstrated  a  relation  between  amount  of 
hindsight  bias  and  performance  by  investment  bankers.    The  better  performing  bankers 
exhibit less bias.  Similarly, Fenton-O’Creevy et al. (2003) gave a test to financial traders 
designed to measure susceptibility to the “illusion of control” (Langer 1975).  They found 
that the less susceptible earned higher performance-related pay.   
Our analytical results show that successful entrepreneurs are less overconfident than 
failures and this is consistent with empirical evidence. Duchesneau and Gartner (1990), for 
example, conducted a field study of an emerging industry with high uncertainty and found 
that lead entrepreneurs in unsuccessful companies  relied less  on outside professional and 
advisors and believed that they had more control of their success in business than successful   17 
entrepreneurs. Similarly, Koellinger et al. (2007) concluded that countries with a high rate of 
entrepreneurial  self-confidence  have  more  start-ups  and  lower  average  survival  chances. 
Finally, Wu and Knott (2006) found evidence of greater overplacement among failures than 
among successes. On the other hand, none of these results means that excess entry is due to 
overconfidence.  In  fact,  our  model  suggests  that  excess  entry  can  occur  even  when  all 
potential entrepreneurs are  underconfident.  Another  important  result  of  our  model is  that 
overconfidence can have two different effects. It reduces both missed opportunities and the 
success rate of entrepreneurs who decide to enter the market.   
An important implication of our model relates to the conditions under which a new 
market will result in equilibrium in the sense that there is no excess entry. Consider a set up 
similar  to  Camerer  and  Lovallo  (1999)  where  market  capacity  is  limited  (only  c  of  N 
participants can enter).  Here, equilibrium can only be achieved if either (a) signal validity is 
perfect (rxy = 1.0) such that potential entrants know for sure whether or not they should enter, 
or (b) when signal validity is imperfect (rxy < 1.0), the number of entrants who fail to enter 
but who should have is matched exactly by the number who enter but who should not have – 
in  other  words when  individual  errors cancel each other  out.   However, one  would only 
expect  to  see  the  latter  occur  when  potential  entrants  perceive  that  the  economic 
consequences of the two types of error are equal.  It is not clear that this will generally be the 
case and thus the only way to reduce excess entry is to increase signal validity (i.e., decrease 
skill uncertainty).   
Our work questions whether the psychological explanation of overconfidence accounts 
for excess entry. It is tempting to think, therefore, that the economic theory of risk-taking is 
sufficient to explain the phenomenon and to conclude at this point. However, we do not 
believe this would be wise. First, it would be problematic to disconfirm the economic theory 
by empirical data because observations of excess entry could be easily rationalized after the 
fact.  Second,  the  economic  explanation  provides  little  or  no  insight  into  how  potential 
entrepreneurs  appraise  the  risks  they  face  nor  how  they  judge  whether  these  risks  are 
acceptable.  And third, it provides no clues as to how entrepreneurs might better assess risks. 
Instead, we believe that an examination of the types and sources of confidence that 
influence entry decisions can be most instructive.  Following the lead of Moore and Healy 
(2008), we have in this paper considered differences between types of confidence judgments, 
that is, estimation and placement. We suspect that for many traits or abilities, estimation 
judgments  are  fairly  easy  to  make  (and  possibly  plausibly  accurate)  if  they  relate  to  a   18 
person’s past experiences (e.g., you can estimate how well you do something if you have 
done  it  –  or  something  similar  –  several  times  before).  On  the  other  hand,  placement 
judgments strike us as being much more difficult as we necessarily know more about our own 
abilities than those of others.  Thus, unless we are able to assume that we are just like others, 
it is not clear how people can make these judgments accurately.  Indeed, in both a field study 
of  entrepreneurs  and  a  laboratory  study  involving  students  playing  a  market-entry  game, 
Moore  et  al.  (2007)  showed  evidence  of  what  they  called  “myopic  self-focus.”    When 
considering market-entry decisions participants paid disproportionate attention to their own 
internal characteristics and little to those of competitors or the external market in general.  As 
Moore  et  al.  (2007)  wisely  suggest,  much  could  be  gained  by  helping  potential  market 
entrants investigate external conditions more thoroughly. 
 It  is  sometimes  said  that,  whereas  overconfidence  is  dysfunctional  for  individual 
entrepreneurs, it is functional for society in that many individual failures are necessary to 
achieve success at the societal level. We disagree. As we have shown, greater overconfidence 
implies  less  missed  opportunities  but  also  more  failures.  Skill  uncertainty  or  judgmental 
fallibility plays an important role in why entrepreneurs enter businesses that fail. However, it 
also plays a role in why people fail to enter businesses they should have entered. Reducing 
skill uncertainty diminishes both missed opportunities and failures. Society would be better 
off as a whole if entrepreneurs were better able to estimate their abilities in both absolute and 
relative terms. However, this is not the same as saying excess entry is due to overconfidence.  
The main implication of our work is to emphasize the importance of training potential 
entrepreneurs to reduce skill uncertainty. Whereas we have no precise “formula for success,” 
we  speculate  that  the  basis  of  such  training  should  follow  principles  relevant  to  the 
acquisition of expertise. These involve, principally, total immersion in the domain of activity 
and learning to improve performance through continued practice with appropriate feedback 
(see, e.g., Ericsson and Charness 1994). However, this is not something that can be achieved 
in a short period of time. In the case of potential entrepreneurs, we believe it would involve – 
in addition to acquiring basic business skills – detailed studies of the specific industry of 
interest and many experiential exercises involving accurate feedback that can increase the 
entrepreneur’s awareness of her skill set – both in isolation and in comparison with others – 
as  well  as  indicating  paths  to  improvement.  Just  how  to  organize  such  educational 
experiences   is an important challenge for society.   
Finally, we conclude with implications of our work for venture capitalists. As is well 
known, venture capitalists rely
 on their own beliefs about the characteristics of a potentially   19 
successful business when assessing new entrepreneurial proposals. The most important block 
of selection criteria appears to be the management team, one component of which is the 
entrepreneur’s self-confidence (Riquelme and Watson 2002). Indeed, one study documented 
the entrepreneur’s “desire for success” as the most important selection criterion (Khan 1987). 
And  yet, in this  study the entrepreneur’s competence  in the field  of endeavor was not a 
significant predictor of venture capitalists’ judgments.  More generally, we suspect that being 
ambitious and willing to succeed is important for success, but that “desire for success” alone 
is  rarely  sufficient.  In  fact,  in  Khan’s  (1987)  study,  “desire  for  success”  was  negatively 
related to the actual outcomes of the ventures. And as shown above, high confidence is not a 
good predictor of success.
6  We suggest, therefore, that venture capitalists will make better 
decisions if they do not equate confidence with skill and experience and, from time to time, 
sample from less confident entrepreneurs. However uncomfortable it may be at the moment 
of the decision, it may lead to revising erroneous implicit models of project selection as well 
as discovering unexpected talents.  
 
  
    
                                                 
6 In fact, venture capitalists themselves are overconfident. Zacharakis and Shepherd (2001) documented that 
96% of 51 Silicon Valley venture capitalists that participated in their study overestimated their ability to predict 
the success of new ventures. In addition, more overconfident venture capitalists were less accurate in their 
decisions.    20 
Appendix  
 
When does market entry take place? The cut-off for the entrepreneur's decision, xc. 
 
  Entrepreneur i will choose to enter the market if her estimated skill to succeed in this 
market is greater than the cut-off xc. The cut-off xc is determined by solving the indifference 
equation (1) for  xi.  
The parameters required to solve the equation are: (1)  [ ] Y E  and  y s , the parameters of 
the distribution of true skill; (2)  [ ] X E and  x s , the parameters of the distribution of estimated 
skill;  (3)  xy r ,  the  correlation  between  true  and  estimated  skills  (signal  validity  or  skill 
uncertainty); (4)  c y , the success cut-off point; and (5) K, the cost of entry.  In what follows, 
we assume that both X and Y are N(0,1).  
By varying the cost of entry, K, we illustrate three scenarios, with K= 0.1, 0.4, and 1.0.  
Within each scenario, we vary both signal validity, xy r  and the success cut-off percentile, c y . 
To find numerically the solution of equation (1), we calculate the value of its left hand side, 
( ) ∫ ∫
¥
¥ -
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c
c
y
i X Y c
y
i X Y dy x y f K y y dy x y f K ) ( ) ( ,  for  all  values  of  xi  within  the  range  of 
[ ] x X s 3 ± E ,  i.e.,  for  [ ] 3 ; 3 - Î i x .  We  use  the  solution  of  equation  (1),  xc*  to  find  the 
probability of entry,  { }
*
c x x P > .   
The  results  are  presented  in  Figure  I  in  the  main  text  where  the  curves  depict  the 
probability of entry as a function of xy r . One curve corresponds to each level of c y . Within 
each cost scenario (represented by the three panels), there are several similar trends. First, at 
higher c y -percentiles  (i.e.,  less  successes  can  be  accommodated  by  the  market),  the 
probability of entry decreases. That is, there are fewer entrants in more stringent markets. 
Second, larger xy r  implies more entry in stringent markets (i.e., high c y -percentiles). In less 
stringent markets (i.e., low c y -percentiles), larger  xy r  leads to less entry. In addition, the 
critical point of  c y  at which the effect of  xy r  on the probability of entry reverses depends on 
the cost of entry decision (K).  When the cost of entry is higher, less skill uncertainty implies 
more entry for a wider range of markets. In our example, when K = 0.1 (left panel), the 
positive effect of  xy r  on entry is observed only in more stringent markets - starting at the 90
th   21 
percentile of c y . When K =1.0 (right panel), this positive effect is observed in all markets 
starting at the 21
st percentile of c y .  
Finally, the overall effect of a larger cost of entry, K, is to decrease entry.  
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r xy 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9
x c* 
(1) -3.0 -1.5 -0.8 -0.4 -0.2 3.0 1.8 1.2 1.0 0.9 3.0 3.0 2.2 1.7 1.5
1 Proportion entering market, % 99.9 93.8 78.5 66.3 56.8 0.1 3.7 11.3 15.6 17.4 0.1 0.1 1.4 4.3 6.7
2 Proportion of excess entry (failures), % 30.9 29.4 23.5 15.0 4.0 69.5 43.5 35.0 23.2 6.9 84.4 49.9 37.5 26.1 8.0
3 Proportion missed opportunities, %  69.2 46.2 42.2 38.0 34.0 30.9 29.9 26.5 22.3 17.7 15.9 15.8 15.2 13.3 10.4
4 Proportion of overestimation (%) among: 
All potential entrants  50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.1 50.0
Entrants 50.1 52.8 57.5 58.7 56.3 99.9 94.1 83.1 73.6 63.2 99.9 98.9 92.7 81.2 67.1
Non-entrants 0.1 8.1 22.5 32.9 41.8 49.9 48.3 45.8 45.6 47.2 49.9 49.9 49.4 48.7 48.8
Successful entrants 34.6 39.0 45.5 51.5 54.5 99.8 89.5 73.9 65.7 60.5 99.6 97.9 88.3 74.5 64.2
Excess entrants (failures) 84.7 85.9 96.9 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
5 Average difference between estimated and true skill
(2) among: 
All potential entrants  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Entrants 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 3.3 1.5 0.9 0.5 0.1 3.3 2.3 1.3 0.6 0.2
Non-entrants -3.3 -1.4 -0.7 -0.3 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Successful entrants -0.5 -0.3 -0.1 0.0 0.0 2.1 0.9 0.4 0.2 0.1 1.8 1.5 0.8 0.4 0.1
Excess entrants (failures) 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.0 0.8 3.8 2.4 1.7 1.3 0.8 3.6 3.0 2.1 1.4 0.9
6 Proportion of overplacement (relative to y c) (%) among: 
All potential entrants  21.4 17.5 14.5 11.1 6.3 21.3 17.4 14.5 11.1 6.3 13.4 11.3 9.6 7.5 4.3
Entrants 21.4 18.6 18.5 15.0 4.0 69.5 43.5 35.0 23.2 6.9 84.4 49.9 37.5 26.1 8.0
Non-entrants 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.4 9.3 21.3 16.4 11.9 8.9 6.2 13.3 11.3 9.2 6.7 4.1
Successful entrants 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Excess entrants (failures) 69.3 63.4 78.8 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
7 Proportion of overplacement (relative to y c)  given overestimation (%) among: 
All potential entrants  42.7 34.9 29.1 22.1 12.6 42.7 34.9 29.0 22.2 12.7 26.7 22.7 19.2 15.0 8.6
Entrants 42.7 35.3 32.2 25.5 7.2 69.6 46.3 42.1 31.5 10.9 84.4 50.4 40.5 32.1 11.9
Non-entrants 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.4 22.3 42.6 34.0 26.0 19.5 13.1 26.6 22.6 18.7 13.7 8.3
Successful entrants 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Excess entrants (failures) 81.7 73.8 81.4 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
y c = 0.5 (69%) y c = 1.0 (84%) y c = - 0.5 (31%)
Table I:  The Effect of the Correlation between Estimated and True Skill (rxy).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes:         
(1) xc is the entry decision cut-off,  yc is the success cut-off, and rxy is signal validity. At xc* 
the expected payoff of entry is zero. X is estimated skill, Y is true skill. Both are N(0,1).
       
(2) Positive values indicate overestimation, negative values indicate underestimation.  
 
(3) In this example, cost of entry, K is 0.1.             26 
E [X] -0.9 -0.5 0.0 0.5 0.9 -0.9 -0.5 0.0 0.5 0.9 -0.9 -0.5 0.0 0.5 0.9
x c* 
(1)     -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2
1 Proportion entering market, % 45.6 61.4 78.5 90.2 95.4 1.7 4.4 11.3 23.8 37.9 0.1 0.3 1.4 4.4 9.5
2 Proportion of excess entry (failures), % 15.3 19.1 23.5 27.0 28.8 20.2 26.4 34.9 43.6 50.1 22.4 28.3 37.6 47.2 55.1
3 Proportion missed opportunities, %  56.1 50.4 42.2 33.4 26.7 30.0 28.9 26.4 22.8 19.2 15.8 15.7 15.2 14.2 12.8
4 Proportion of overestimation (%) among: 
All potential entrants  18.4 30.8 50.0 69.2 81.6 18.4 30.9 50.0 69.1 81.6 18.4 30.9 50.0 69.2 81.6
Entrants 30.4 41.7 57.5 73.1 83.4 64.7 73.6 83.0 90.0 93.9 81.2 87.4 92.7 96.2 97.8
Non-entrants 8.4 13.6 22.5 33.5 43.3 17.6 28.9 45.8 62.6 74.1 18.3 30.7 49.4 68.0 79.9
Successful entrants 19.2 29.2 45.5 63.7 77.0 55.8 64.1 73.9 82.2 87.9 75.8 82.4 88.3 92.8 95.2
Excess entrants (failures) 92.2 94.5 96.8 98.4 99.2 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
5 Average difference between estimated and true skill
(2) among: 
All potential entrants  -0.9 -0.5 0.0 0.5 0.9 -0.9 -0.5 0.0 0.5 0.9 -0.9 -0.5 0.0 0.5 0.9
Entrants -0.5 -0.2 0.2 0.6 1.0 0.3 0.6 0.8 1.1 1.4 0.8 1.0 1.3 1.6 1.8
Non-entrants -1.3 -1.0 -0.7 -0.4 -0.2 -0.9 -0.5 -0.1 0.3 0.6 -0.9 -0.5 0.0 0.5 0.8
Successful entrants -0.7 -0.4 -0.1 0.3 0.7 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.1
Excess entrants (failures) 0.7 0.8 1.1 1.3 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 2.0 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.4
6 Proportion of overplacement (relative to y c) (%) among: 
All potential entrants  4.3 8.2 14.5 21.1 25.3 2.6 6.1 14.5 27.3 39.0 1.3 3.4 9.6 21.1 33.8
Entrants 9.5 13.3 18.5 23.4 26.5 20.2 26.4 34.9 43.6 50.1 22.4 28.3 37.6 47.2 55.1
Non-entrants 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.2 5.2 11.9 22.2 32.3 1.2 3.4 9.2 19.9 31.5
Successful entrants 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Excess entrants (failures) 62.4 69.7 78.7 86.9 92.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
7 Proportion of overplacement (relative to y c)  given overestimation (%) among: 
All potential entrants  23.6 26.4 29.0 30.5 31.0 13.9 19.8 29.0 39.5 47.8 6.8 11.2 19.2 30.5 41.4
Entrants 31.4 31.9 32.1 32.0 31.8 31.2 35.9 42.0 48.4 53.3 27.6 32.4 40.6 49.1 56.3
Non-entrants 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.7 18.0 26.0 35.5 43.6 6.7 11.0 18.7 29.3 39.5
Successful entrants 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Excess entrants (failures) 67.7 73.7 81.3 88.2 92.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
y c = 0.5 (69%) y c = 1.0 (84%) y c = - 0.5 (31%)
Table II:  The Effect of Confidence at the Level of the Population, E(X). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes:         
(1) xc is the entry decision cut-off and yc is the success cut-off. At xc* the expected payoff 
of entry is zero. X is estimated skill, Y is true skill. X  is N (E[X],1); Y is N (0,1). 
       
(2) Positive values indicate overestimation, negative values indicate underestimation.  
 
(3) In this example, signal validity, rxy  is 0.5, and cost of entry, K is 0.1.   27 
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Figure I: The Effect of the Success Cut-Off (Yc) and the Correlation between Estimated and True Ability (rxy) 
on the Probability of Entry.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Yc is the success cut-off percentile. 
 
   
 